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RECENT CASES
The argument for the deductibility of the legal expense in the instant case is that
the gift tax deficiency, if uncontested, would have consumed property held by the
taxpayer for the production of income, hence the legal expense was for the conserva-
tion of property held for the production of income. This approach does not consider
the nature of the activity to which the expense relates but considers only the result of
incurring the expense. The legal expenses incurred in defending any claim which
could be asserted against a taxpayer would be expenses for the conservation of the
taxpayer's property, hence, following this approach, all legal expenses would be
deductible. It is submitted that this goes far beyond the intent of Congress in the
enactment of § 23 (a) (2) and that the preferable result is that reached in the instant
case.
In the recent case of Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 646 (C.A. 8th 1952), it was
held that a taxpayer's legal expenses incurred in arranging a property settlement fol-
lowing the taxpayer's divorce were deductible expenses under § 23 (a) (2). There the
court considers the Lykes case as clearly a family transaction.which had nothing to do
with the conservation or maintenance of property held by the taxpayer for income
producing purposes. The legal expenses in the Baer case are distinguished as being
directed to the conservation and maintenance of property held by the taxpayer for
income producing purposes. It is submitted that the majority there adopts the approach
unsuccessfully urged in the Lykes case and, as the dissent points out, the two cases
should turn on the same principle. The Baer case indicates an apparent lack of sym-
pathy with the interpretation of § 23(a) (2) employed in the Bingham and Lykes
cases. Conceding that it may be inequitable to forbid the deduction of legal expenses
such as those incurred by Baer and by Lykes, the remedy should come from further
amendment of the Internal Revenue Code by Congress, not an unwarranted interpreta-
tion thereof by the courts.
WILLIAM S. SrnNmN
Income Tax-Funds Received by Extortion as Income. T was an associate of X
during prohibition when they were bootlegging liquor. After the partnership split up,
T demanded money from X. When T threatened the lives of X and his family, X paid
T $250,000. Held: The extorted funds are taxable to T as income since they were ob-
tained under a "semblance of a bona fide claim of right" and in effect, without oblga-
tion to repay since X was not likely ever to press demand for a return of the money.
Ruthin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
In 1916 the word "lawful" was omitted from the then existing definition of net
income in section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Since that time there has been
a constant stream of cases determining which income resulting from unlawful activi-
ties may be taxable and which may not. On the one hand are the cases which hold the
funds not taxable since it is like a loan due to the obligation to repay the owner,
Wilcox V. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 933 (C.A. 9th 1945) (embezzlement) ; McKnight
v. Commissioner, 127 F. 2d 572 (C.A. 5th 1942) (embezzlement). On the other hand,
there are the cases in which the funds are held taxable because they were received
under a claim of right, U.S. v. Currier Lumber Co., 70 F. Supp. 219 (App. D.C. 1947)
(majority stockholder theft of company checks) ; Kurrie v. Helvering, 126 F. 2d 723
(C.A. 8th 1942) (profits from embezzled funds) ; Moore v. Thomas, 131 F. 2d 611
(C.A. 5th 1942) (excessive fees charged); Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. 2d 122 (App.
D.C. 1937) (usurious interest) ; North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S.
417 (1932) (litigated funds); or because legal title had been passed by the owner
having given over the funds "voluntarily" although by reason of fraud, Akers v. Sco-
field, 167 F. 2d 718 (C.A. 5th 1948) (swindling); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125
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F. 2d 340 (C.A. 7th 1942) (ransom money); National City Bank v. Helvering, 98
F. 2d 93 (C.A. 2d 1938) (illicit bonus) ; Droge v. Commissioner, 35 BTA 829 (1937)
(Irish sweepstakes) ; U.S. v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (bootlegging) ; or because
the funds are not subject to recovery by the owner under applicable law, Chadick v.
U.S., 77 F. 2d 961 (C.A. 5th 1935) (graft) ; Greenfeld v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 318
(C.A. 4th 1947) (receipt of stolen bonds).
Although the Rutkin case is discussed by the court as being an example of the
"claim of right" group, it is a very weak case for such a theory. Under the modified
claim of right theory as exemplified in this case, it would seem that any funds received
by a gangster would be taxable no matter how weak or untenable his claim, as long
as some claim was found to exist in however minuscule degree. The case weakens the
stringent rule given by the Wilcox case which required a bona fide claim of right plus
an absence of obligation to repay in order to hold the funds taxable. By so doing, the
Rutkin case goes a long way toward extending the claim of right doctrine farther into
the income of the underworld. Through it, the road may be opened to finding some of
the incomes derived from larceny and embezzlement to be taxable which, prior to this
case had been held not taxable, McKnight case, supra and Wilcox case, supra, re-
spectively. It should be noted that the case could easily have been decided on the
alternative doctrine of "voluntary" passage of title. Rutkin did not take the money; it
was given to him, albeit under pressure, and just as the ransom money in the Hum-
phreys case, supra, was taxable because title had passed, so the Rutkin funds could be
held taxable. Alternatively, the case could have been determined on the theory of
Greenfeld, supra, which held that, even if no title had passed, the money is taxable in
the hands of the racketeer if the true owner cannot recover it under state law. This
theory would be applicable in the Rutkin case because the statute of limitations had
run on the extortion although the court did not emphasize that fact.
The theoretical fallacy inherent in the cases which hold the funds taxable is that the
one who should have all the money is the true owner; while the extortioner has no
right to any of the money and, a fortiori, the United States has less right to taxes
levied thereon. Since such theoretical niceties run into the practical consideration that
the owner actually will not get it back, the cases sometimes result in hair splitting.
The practical argument by the government is that at least the gangsters should be
taxed (and jailed for income tax evasion if they persist in nonpayment of taxes),
while the countervailing argument is that, as such jailing is a subterfuge used to punish
gangsters for violation of the state criminal law, it is therefore an invasion of the
criminal jurisdiction of the state.
Regardless of the above variance in theoretical bases it would seem that there are
now three circumstances in which the courts plug the illegal income tax evasion gap
or punish for failure to pay such taxes: (1) when money is obtained under neither
claim of right nor title but the owner has no remedy so that the funds are irretrievably
passed to the gangster; (2) when money is obtained by transfer of voidable title by
the owner; and (3) when money is obtained under any semblance of a claim of right
from the owner. Until Congress amends the Internal Revenue Code to cover spe-
cifically all illegal income with provision for refund in case of recovery by the owner,
such patchwork by the courts is a necessity.
ELEANOR H. EDWARDS
Unemployment Compensation-Quitting Work for Good Cause-Question of Law or
Fact. A was working on an "inside job" for $1.63 per hour plus $.10 for working the
second shift when he was told that he was to be transferred to an "outside job" at
$1.43 per hour without an opportunity for the shift differential. A refused to accept the
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